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Marketplaces have existed for thousands of years, literally -- some of the notable, older 
ones include the Agora of Athens, Trajan’s Market in Rome, and the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul. 
For much of history, marketplaces virtually remained the same: an open area where buyers and 
sellers meet and exchange goods. As history evolved, and with the arrival of the Industrial 
Revolution, the sellers evolved from being individuals to large corporations. For example, the 
farmer’s market evolved into a supermarket, and large corporations replaced the farmers. 
The internet brought these traditionally offline marketplaces online. With that, came a 
host of new features, like reviews, and the enablement of new behaviors, like instant price 
comparisons. In most instances, these online marketplaces, like Amazon, Expedia, Ticketmaster, 
and iTunes, still connect massive companies (and their products) to consumers.  
However, as the internet developed, peer-to-peer marketplaces, like eBay and Craigslist, 
were created, harkening back to the markets of hundreds of years ago, where individuals would 
transact with fellow individuals. 
The most recent iteration of the peer-to-peer marketplace, and the topic of this paper, 
is the peer-to-peer rental marketplace. Collectively, these comprise the “sharing economy.” For 
the most part, these marketplaces allow users to frictionlessly rent goods (and in some cases, 
services) from other users. 
 
 
  
Why I Include Gig Economy startups (“Uber for X”) in the P2P rental marketplace / Sharing 
Economy 
 
** I include on-demand service startups (i.e., gig economy), in this category of peer-to-peer 
rental startups, since rather than people renting goods to each other, they’re renting their time. 
These startups are also known as “Uber for X” startups, given their business model resemblance 
to the ease-of-use, speed, and on-demand nature of Uber. 
 
Examples of startups in this category would include Handy, TaskRabbit, Wag (on-
demand dog walking), and Zeel (on-demand, in-home massages). Through Zeel, for example, 
the user rents the time of the masseuse (and effectively, their accompanying massage table, 
too). In Handy, a user is renting an electrician’s time (and effectively, their accompanying 
equipment, too). 
Similar to P2P rental marketplace (“sharing economy”) startups, gig economy startups 
enable individuals on the demand-side to transact directly with individuals on the supply-side. 
For example, Handy allows a user to pay a plumber or landscaper directly, instead of going 
through Roto-Rooter or a landscaping agency, respectively; hence, my classification of them as 
peer-to-peer. 
 
  
What caused the emergence of peer-to-peer rental marketplaces (“sharing economy 
startups”)? 
 
It is no coincidence that these startups emerged alongside the smartphone. Uber’s user 
experience, for example, would not be as seamless if phones did not have GPS, and thus, 
someone could not track the arrival of their ride, for example. 
Many sharing economy startups also require a cost-effective way to run background 
checks, which would not be possible without Checkr, an API that performs this service and is 
used by Uber, Lyft, Postmates, GrubHub, and others. Checkr itself could not have existed before 
the mid-200s since it checks digital records from county and DMVs across the country. Many of 
these records either weren’t digitized or brought online until many years after the advent of 
the internet. 
Interestingly, many gig economy startups were founded around the time of the Great 
Recession. The high jobless rate was a tailwind as unemployed people were willing to accept 
any job (or “gig”) that paid them a fair wage. The recession also made users more price-
sensitive, another tailwind given sharing economy startups, like Airbnb, are often able to 
provide solutions that are more cost-effective than the incumbents. 
 
  
Why P2P Rental Marketplaces (“Sharing Economy” Startups) are So Popular: 
 
By replacing intermediaries (brokers, agents, dispatchers, etc.) with technology, these 
startups provide certain advantages. Here are three examples: 
 
Lower Cost: Many intermediaries (e.g., brokers) are human. By replacing costly labor with 
technology, these startups shift down the cost curve. In exchange for their service, these 
startups charge a “take rate” (shortened to “rake”), a percentage of the GMV / transaction 
volume, which is often smaller than what a human intermediary would, and can, charge. 
 
Convenient and Quicker: Technology eliminates the need to travel to, or call, a broker. P2P 
marketplaces are also often available 24/7 rather than solely during business hours. 
 
Integrated Payment: In the case of BlaBlaCar (a carpooling platform), the driver is paid digitally 
automatically. This is a better experience than the offline experience of asking the passenger 
for cash, or potentially, have the passenger evade the fair by abruptly leaving the car at the end 
of the trip. 
 
  
Evolution of P2P Marketplaces in General (both “sharing economy” and otherwise) 
Note: this section is based on the “What's Next for Marketplace Startups?” article by 
Andreessen Horowitz. Link given in Works Cited. 
 
Part 1: Unspecialized and horizontal marketplaces (e.g. Craigslist). 
 
These marketplaces arose alongside the advent of the internet and often took physical 
or offline directories and put them online. (e.g. Craigslist was a digital version of help-wanted 
flyers that people stuck to telephone poles.) 
They were broad, horizontal, and lacked basic marketplace features like reviews, ratings, 
and payments (the onus fell on the end-user to check out the service- or goods-provider). These 
directories primarily focused on the discovery part of the purchase funnel and users had to 
perform the other parts themselves, like conducting due-diligence, shipping of the goods, 
taking on risk of the other party not delivering (effectively acting as their own underwriter), etc. 
 
Part 2: Basic, verticalized marketplaces (e.g., Airbnb, Homeadvisor, Trulia, Upwork) 
 
By being vertical-specific and constrained to a particular industry, the goods listed on 
these marketplaces had profiles that were more relevant to the service being offered (e.g., all 
profiles on Trulia include a number-of-bathrooms field, something not all homes listed on 
Craigslist, for example, are guaranteed to have). Being specialized also enabled them to offer 
other features (e.g., HomeAdvisor, a platform where users can book professionals like 
plumbers, landscapers, painters, etc., has a button to request a quote from service providers. 
Users don’t have to compose an email from scratch, like they’d have to do on Craigslist). 
Reviews were also more specialized (e.g., Airbnb could ask users to rate specific parts of the 
service, like cleanliness, noise level, etc.). Despite these added features, many of these 
platforms still acted as listing services (e.g., the appointment scheduling and payment still 
happened offline on Angie’s List). 
 
Part 3: On-demand apps (e.g., Uber, Wag, Glamsquad, Doordash) 
 
These apps are on-demand, meaning a user doesn’t have to schedule an appointment to 
receive the service. They enable users to order services, often with just a few clicks on their 
app. The app handles the pricing of services and stuff like collecting credit card information. It 
also instantly connects the supply-side with the demand-side. (e.g., Handy allows users to have 
a qualified TV installation person show up at their home without the user having to call up firms 
one-by-one and set up an appointment). With Uber, riders are paired with drivers in a matter of 
minutes. Doordash customers’ orders are immediately routed to the appropriate delivery 
person. Unlike previous platforms, these platforms are full-stack and closed the loop -- they 
handled top of the funnel (discovery), mid-funnel (delivery of service), and bottom of the funnel 
(payment and post-experience survey/review). 
 
Part 4: End-to-End Marketplaces (e.g. TheRealReal, StockX) 
 
Whereas the speed of on-demand marketplaces is great for low-stakes and easy-to-
deliver services, more complicated and hands-on tasks, like finding a babysitter or a buyer for 
your home, need a more careful approach. For example, while one can buy used, rare Air 
Jordans on Craigslist, the risks of receiving a counterfeit are high and people often don’t have 
the necessary expertise to authenticate the goods themselves. Because of this common 
problem, the startup StockX obtains a used sneaker, authenticates and cleans it, and then lists 
it on its site for someone to buy. It’s still a marketplace that connects buyers and sellers 
because the sellers can choose what price they want their sneakers to be listed on StockX for. 
Because of the additional service and trust delivered, managed marketplaces’ fees are a higher 
percentage of the transaction than a normal marketplaces’. 
 
  
Literature Review 
 
Mingming Chengs’s co-citation analysis of research on the sharing economy reveals that the 
current research on the topic focuses on the following five topics areas: 
 
Societal trends providing tailwinds for the sharing economy: 
Traditionally, the easiest way for someone to signal wealth or status was for them to 
own a particular object, like a car or watch. However, Chen and Marx have researched why, in 
today’s shifting consumer environment, that is no longer always true. For example, studies 
have partially attributed the rise of the sharing economy to consumers’ appetite to reduce their 
effect on the environment (Schor & Fitzmaurice, Forno & Garibaldi, and Cohen & Munoz). By 
increasing the utilization of fixed assets, like houses, by using Airbnb, consumers reduce the 
environmental waste that comes along with constructing hotels. These large projects consume 
considerable economic resources and disrupt the surrounding environment. Another social 
tailwind that has accelerated millennials’ shift to platforms like Airbnb is their desire for more 
genuine and native experiences (Sigala). When vacationing in Japan, why live in a Marriott 
when you can rent a ‘minka’? Why eat pasta from the restaurant in the Hilton in Brazil when 
you can relish a home-cooked pamonha made by your Airbnb host? On a related note, Botsman 
and Rogers also highlighted consumer’s desire for more social and friendly connections in what 
seems to be an increasingly discordant society. It is not surprising the sharing economy delivers 
on that promise. Rather than living alone in a sterilized, unemotional hotel room, Airbnb 
enables its guests to more authentically experience their destination’s culture. 
A number of studies have also been conducted on the social impact of these sharing 
economy platforms; Fang demonstrated that these platforms lead to an increase in job creation 
and upward mobility in the regions they operate. This makes sense given P2P marketplaces 
directly transfer money from the seller to the buyer: locals living in Airbnbs end up paying locals 
for their homes rather than enriching the pockets of large, international hotel corporations. 
However, it is not all sunshine and rainbows: Schor and Fitzmaurice have pointed out 
that these newly minted jobs are not unionized, are sometimes more precarious than their 
predecessors (by not having safety measures and regulations in place), and they do not come 
with benefits like insurance or social security. Therefore, while these ‘gig economy’ jobs are 
more efficient from a market forces perspective by perfectly matching supply and demand to 
find the optimal clearing price, they are less socially optimal. 
 
Consumer behavior: 
Botsman and Rogers’ 2010 book The Rise of Collaborative Consumption predated the 
popularization of the term “sharing economy” and detailed the rise of “models of consumption 
that emphasize usefulness over ownership, community over selfishness, and sustainability over 
novelty” (Botsman and Rogers). This is a notable behavior departing from the individualistic 
consumption practices popular prior to the popularization of the sharing economy. Bardhi and 
Eckhardt studied the elements that construct what they call “access-based consumption,” 
which they characterize as buying/selling made possible by the free market and defined by 
someone being given the right to use an object for a limited time. They also discussed the social 
/ psychological effects of such behavior. For example, when people own things, they often 
assimilate part of the item into their representation of themselves. For example, an owner of a 
Prius might begin to think of themselves as a responsible, eco-friendly citizen. However, such 
behaviors are not possible with access-based consumption (i.e. the sharing economy). 
 
Sharing behaviors: 
Research has also been done on the effects of the “sharing” behavior created by these 
platforms, such as their contribution to “equality, mutuality, honesty, openness, empathy, and 
an ethic of care” (John, 2013). Lamberton and Rose conducted a study on what factors increase 
the likeliness of the existence of a given sharing economy marketplace and included the 
following: cases where the barriers for sharing are low and the upside easily recognizable, the 
relative supply and demand of the product, how heavily is people’s time of usage correlated to 
each other (e.g. people often watch TV at the same times, like at night, whereas their need for 
power drills is staggered), and people’s readiness to share (e.g. people don’t want to share 
toothbrushes, but will share dresses). 
 
Trust: 
A major factor in the success of sharing economy platforms is trust among users. 
Outsourcing trust to a platform and getting into a stranger’s car, or sharing a house with a 
stranger, involves not only logistical challenges for the platforms, like coordinating millions of 
background checks, but also social mindset evolution (Molz 2013). Users are not the only party 
these platforms have to engender the trust of. Governments are wary of how recklessly some 
of these startups ignore regulations, and potentially put their users’ safety in jeopardy, along 
with other concerns, like ignoring disability compliance regulations and invading consumer 
rights (Juul, 2015; Rauch and Schleicher, 2015). Some of the platforms also serve as an 
economic threat in the regions they operate; Airbnb perpetuates housing shortages and 
increases average rent prices in some of its cities (Edelman and Geradin, 2015). 
 
Innovation: 
Lastly, research has also been conducted regarding the social and technological 
innovation the sharing economy heralds. In the early 21st century, society became more 
cognizant of the depletion of natural resources and turned to the internet as a way of attacking 
the problem by bringing online assets that were traditionally offline, thus increasing 
searchability, shareability, and utilization (Botsman and Rogers). 
The success of online marketplaces is often judged by how much of their respective 
offline market they can capture and bring online. Certain platforms, like Uber, have gotten so 
large that they have expanded the size of the total addressable market, itself. Uber’s alone has 
grown larger than the entire taxi market pre-Uber. Airbnb has made it possible for any 
homeowner or renter to start a hospitality business with virtually no upfront cost (Nadler, 
2014). It has also allowed seasonal tourist destinations to better respond to increases in 
demand by expanding the supply of accommodations (Juul, 2015). Bringing offline goods online 
has resulted in numerous benefits. 
 
Much of the academic research regarding this industry has focused on theoretical 
aspects, whether it be examining the role of social movements that have enabled these 
startups to flourish or diving into how governments are responding to these massive, 
distributed P2P platforms. However, very little research has focused on the key determinants 
that enable particular sharing economy platforms to thrive. 
While there have been some studies in this space, they often hone in on one particular 
determinant (or just a few) and do a deep dive. For example, Schmalensee’s 2010 study 
analyzed the role of customer behavior and tastes to cross the critical mass hurdle platforms 
need to survive. Kietzmann’s 2014 study looks at only ride-sharing / mobility sharing economy 
models, and within that, focuses primarily on the role that public transportation and elected 
officials play within a given city. Filippas, Horton, and Zeckhauser’s study focused on only two 
product characteristics: frequency of usage (e.g., a toothbrush is used every day, whereas a 
canoe is used sparingly) and predictability of usage (e.g., the timing of the need for a tuxedo is 
often determined weeks or months in advance, whereas the timing of the need for a backup 
generator is unpredictable).   
 
Research Methodology 
 
Goal: See how different characteristics affect the success of P2P marketplace startups. 
 
Step 1: How do you make a list of P2P marketplace startups? 
 
● First, I used various keywords to search Crunchbase to first get a list of as many 
marketplace startups as I could find. There are ~5,000. Then, I manually went through 
each of those marketplace startups to identify those that were also peer-to-peer. I 
found 553 of them. 
● I then classified those 553 P2P marketplace startups into 93 categories. E.g. Uber and 
Lyft are both “ridesharing” and Doordash and Grubhub are both “food-delivery.” 
 
Step 2: How do you measure “success”? 
 
● Ideally, you would use a metric like revenue or valuation. However, since there isn’t 
much public data on individual startups’ revenue or valuations, I used the following 
metric: amount of funding raised. 
● I know this is an imperfect metric since a startup (like WeWork) can raise a lot of 
funding and still be a failure, but it was the best metric available to me. 
 
Step 3: Come up with a list of characteristics you want to test. 
 
● However, all P2P marketplace startups don’t have the same characteristics. For 
example, Rent The Runway has different characteristics than Uber, so you can’t run the 
same experiment on both. 
 
So: 
 
I took the 93 categories of P2P marketplace startups and divided them into 3 groups: 
 
● P2P Service (On-Demand) Marketplaces 
○ E.g. Uber, Lyft, Doordash, on-demand laundry, on-demand house cleaning, etc. 
 
● P2P Rental Marketplaces 
○ E.g. Airbnb, RentTheRunway 
 
● P2P Non-Rental Marketplaces 
○ Craigslist, Poshmark, Artsy, Freelancer.com 
 
I then came up with characteristics to judge each of the groups: 
 
Group 1: P2P Service (On-Demand) Marketplaces 
E.g. Uber, Lyft, Doordash, on-demand laundry, on-demand house cleaning, etc. 
 
 
Characteristics to test: 
● Liquidity 
● # of Competing Startups 
● Gross Margin Per Order 
● Frequency of the Service Used 
● Ability for Service to Be Delivered via Online 
● Price Sensitivity of Consumer in Market 
● Consumer’s Ability to Forecast Timing of Need for Usage of the Service 
● Existence of Geographic Price Arbitrage 
 
Group 2: P2P Rental Marketplaces 
E.g. Airbnb, RentTheRunway 
 
Characteristics to test: 
● Price of Item 
● Durability of Item 
● Level of Concurrent Use of Item 
● Frequency of Item’s Use 
● Insurability of Item 
● Friction in Obtaining and Returning the Item 
● Liquidity in Market 
● Number of Competitors in Market 
 
Group 3: P2P Non-Rental Marketplace 
E.g. Craigslist, Poshmark, Artsy, Freelancer.com 
 
Characteristics to test: 
● Liquidity in Market 
● Price of Item 
● Cost of Shipping the Item Compared to the Price of Item 
● Ability for Item to be Delivered via Online 
● Ability for Buyer to Verify Quality of Item 
 
Using my best estimate, I evaluated all the startups within a group from 0-10 against each of 
the characteristics of the group. 
  
Group 1: P2P Service (On-Demand) Marketplaces 
E.g. Uber, Lyft, Doordash, on-demand laundry, on-demand house cleaning, etc. 
 
The rightmost column shows the median funding each of the 53 P2P marketplace categories in 
this group. 
 
I sorted the 53 categories by lowest-to-highest median funding and only used the middle 50% 
for the experiments because there are a lot of outliers, both low and high: 
 
 
 Liquidity 
# of 
Competing 
Startups 
Gross 
Margin 
Per 
Order 
Frequency 
of the 
Service 
Used 
Ability for 
Service to 
Be 
Delivered 
via 
Online 
Price 
Sensitivity 
of 
Consumer 
in Market 
Consumer’s 
Ability to 
Forecast 
Timing of 
Need for 
Usage of the 
Service 
Geographic 
Price 
Arbitrage 
Median 
Funding 
On-demand 
carpooling 
7 3 2 8 0 6 9 0 $25,000 
On-demand 
trainers 
6 4 5 5 0 6 5 0 $27,606 
On-demand 
truck rental 
3 2 5 2 0 5 4 0 $40,000 
On-demand 
dietitian (online) 
10 2 4 5 1 4 6 1 $50,000 
On-demand tow 
truck 
3 1 4 2 0 5 4 0 $50,000 
On-demand 
bartenders 
6  4 3 0 5 5 0 $120,000 
On-demand 
experiences 
5 4 6 3 0 3 7 0 $157,500 
On-demand gas 
delivery 
3 2 3 4 0 8 4 0 $275,000 
On-demand 
delivery 
(general) 
7 5 4 5 0 6 5 0 $304,649 
On-demand 
massage 
4 3 7 3 0 5 5 0 $309,569 
On-demand 
laundry 
4 4 4 6 0 7 5 0 $376,675 
On-demand vets 
(online) 
10 2 7 4 1 4 3 1 $418,973 
On-demand 
valet 
6 2 5 4 0 3 3 0 $435,000 
On-demand car 
wash 
4 2 2 2 0 5 7 0 $445,000 
On-demand 
tutoring (online) 
10 7 7 6 1 4 7 1 $500,000 
On-demand 
photographers 
4 2 6 2 0 4 5 0 $501,042 
On-demand 
electronic repair 
6 2 6 1 0 5 1 0 $518,138 
On-demand 
pharmacy 
6 4 6 3 0 5 5 0 $750,000 
On-demand pet 
groomers 
4 3 5 3 0 4 5 0 $800,000 
On-demand IVs 3 1 6 3 0 5 2 0 $870,000 
On-demand 
moving 
5 4 6 1 0 5 6 0 $910,573 
On-demand 
ridesharing 
9 4 4 8 0 7 3 0 $960,000 
On-demand 
beauty services 
8 2 7 3 0 5 7 0 $975,000 
On-demand 
coaches (online) 
10 3 5 4 1 4 6 1 $1,042,009 
On-demand 
cleaning 
8 5 4 6 0 7 7 0 $1,075,000 
On-demand chef 5 2 5 2 0 5 7 0 $1,270,000 
On-demand 
food delivery 
8 7 3 8 0 7 5 0 $1,500,000 
On-demand 
mechanic 
6 2 5 2 0 6 2 0 $1,920,000 
On-demand 
psychic (online) 
10 1 5 3 1 3 5 1 $2,000,000 
On-demand 
groceries 
7 5 4 6 0 7 5 0 $2,000,000 
On-demand 
doctors (online) 
10 3 9 4 1 3 2 1 $2,006,263 
On-demand 
childcare 
7 4 5 7 0 5 9 0 $2,051,050 
On-demand 
storage 
7 2 5 3 0 5 7 0 $2,200,000 
On-demand 
services 
(general) 
3 5 4 4 0 5 5 0 $2,375,040 
On-demand 
home services 
7 6 7 3 0 5 3 0 $2,750,000 
On-demand 
lawyers (online) 
10 1 9 2 1 4 1 1 $3,255,024 
On-demand 
caterers 
6 3 7 3 0 5 7 0 $3,584,232 
On-demand 
therapists 
(online) 
10 5 7 5 1 4 5 1 $3,600,000 
On-demand 
experts (online) 
10 3 6 3 1 5 5 1 $4,850,000 
On-demand 
coders (online) 
10 5 7 4 1 4 6 1 $5,017,963 
On-demand 
flower delivery 
3 2 4 2 0 5 3 0 $5,644,223 
On-demand dog 
sitting 
8 3 3 3 0 5 5 0 $6,494,268 
On-demand 
accountant 
(online) 
10 3 6 3 1 3 7 1 $8,963,121 
On-demand 
workspace 
availability 
4 2 4 6 0 6 7 0 $9,030,000 
On-demand 
digital goods 
10 5 5 5 1 5 5 1 $9,330,000 
On-demand 
travel experts 
(online) 
10 2 6 2 1 5 7 1 $10,454,496 
On-demand 
caregivers 
5 4 5 5 0 6 7 0 $16,575,000 
On-demand 
lawn care 
5 2 4 5 0 5 7 0 $17,607,500 
On-demand 
interior 
designers 
(online) 
10 3 4 2 1 4 7 1 $25,500,000 
On-demand 
freelancers 
(online) 
10 6 5 5 1 5 5 1 $36,227,661 
On-demand 
alcohol delivery 
7 4 4 6 0 7 3 0 $69,560,722 
On-demand 
cannabis 
delivery 
4 3 3 6 0 5 3 0 $202,500,000 
On-demand 
wedding 
professionals 
7 3 7 2 0 3 9 0 $381,065,000 
 
  
Experiment #1: How does liquidity of supply affect a (P2P) on-demand marketplace startup’s 
odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: Higher liquidity increases the odds of success. 
Reasoning: The more liquidity in a market, the better the matches. For example, all else equal, 
a market for on-demand tutors would perform better than that for on-demand car washers 
since there are more of the former than the latter. 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Correct  
Experiment #2: How does the number of competitors affect a (P2P) on-demand marketplace 
startup’s odds of success?  
 
Hypothesis: Inverse correlation between the number of competitors and odds of success 
Reasoning: When a space has multiple, well-capitalized players, often it becomes a price race to 
the bottom where companies sell products below their COGS, create negative gross margin, 
and burn VC dollars in order to gain market share and hopefully force the competitors out of 
business, after which it can raise prices again. This has happened in the ridesharing 
(domestically and internationally) and food delivery business. 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Incorrect 
  
Experiment #3: How does gross margin per order affect a (P2P) on-demand marketplace 
startup’s odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: Higher gross margin increases the odds of success. 
 
Reasoning: Fixed costs across on-demand businesses are fairly similar: they involve the travel 
time for the service provider (SP) to go to the customer’s home. By that reasoning, an on-
demand hairstyling business (margin of $100+ per visit) would do better than an on-demand 
laundry business (margin of <$20 per visit). 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Correct 
  
Experiment #4: How does the frequency of the service used affect a (P2P) on-demand 
marketplace startup’s odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: Increased frequency increases the odds of success 
 
Example: Assuming customer acquisition costs are similar across on-demand businesses, more 
usage per customer = higher LTV = higher profit. 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Correct 
  
Experiment #5: How does the ability for the service to be delivered via online affect a (P2P) on-
demand marketplace startup’s odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: Ability to be delivered via online is correlated with odds of success 
 
Reasoning: Online delivery (e.g. on-demand doctor’s visits via video chat) doesn’t involve costs 
of going to the consumer’s home, like in, say, an on-demand laundry business. 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Correct 
  
Experiment #6: How does the consumer’s price sensitivity in a market affect a (P2P) on-demand 
marketplace startup’s odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: Consumers’ price sensitivity is inversely correlated with odds of success 
 
Reasoning: P2P on-demand marketplaces compete with the consumer doing the service 
themselves (e.g. using Doordash to get food vs. going to the restaurant themselves). If 
consumers are more price sensitive in a particular market (e.g. food delivery), then the startup 
will see less business. However, is the consumer isn’t very price sensitive (e.g. on-demand 
lawyers via video chat), then the startup will do well. In other words, the more consumers are 
willing to pay extra for convenience, the better the startup will do. 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: incorrect 
  
Experiment #7: How does the consumer’s ability to forecast the timing of the need for usage of 
the service affect a (P2P) on-demand marketplace startup’s odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: The consumer’s ability to forecast the timing is inversely correlated with the 
startup’s odds of success 
 
Reasoning: If someone can predict when they will need something, then they don’t need to use 
an on-demand service. However, if they can’t predict when, say, their meeting will end, then 
they will want to use an on-demand service like Uber. 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Correct 
  
Experiment #8: How does geographic price arbitrage affect a (P2P) on-demand marketplace 
startup’s odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: The existence of the opportunity for geographic price arbitrage is correlated with 
the startup’s odds of success. 
 
Reasoning: If an on-demand service is delivered online, like via video chat (e.g. on-demand 
therapists), then the service can charge a lower price than the local price in the consumer’s 
market by obtaining therapists from a cheaper labor market. (e.g. a NYC resident chatting with 
a therapist from Arkansas.) 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Correct  
Group 2: P2P Rental Marketplaces 
E.g. Airbnb, RentTheRunway 
 
The rightmost column shows the median funding each of the 15 P2P marketplace categories in 
this group. 
 
I sorted the 15 categories by lowest-to-highest median funding and only used the middle 50% 
for the experiments because there are a lot of outliers, both low and high: 
 
 
 
Price 
of 
Item 
Durability 
of Item 
Level of 
Concurrent 
Use of Item 
Frequency 
of Item’s 
Use 
Insurability 
of Item 
Friction in 
Obtaining 
and 
Returning 
the Item 
Liquidity 
in 
Market 
Number of 
Competitors 
in Market 
Median 
Funding 
P2P 
instrument 
rental 
6 7 3 4 4 7 6 4 $20,107 
P2P baby 
gear rental 
marketplace 
5 5 3 4 3 6 4 3 $40,000 
P2P 
construction 
tool rental 
7 7 2 2 4 6 4 4 $71,207 
P2P drone 
rental 
6 3 3 3 6 6 3 3 $250,000 
P2P rentals 
(general) 
5 5 4 4 5 5 6 7 $289,000 
P2P clothing 
rental 
5 4 2 4 3 8 10 10 $803,484 
On-demand 
motorcycle 
rental 
7 7 4 3 7 5 6 5 $857,882 
P2P car 
rental 
9 6 3 5 8 4 9 8 $1,275,000 
P2P boat 
rental 
10 8 3 3 10 4 7 4 $1,487,763 
P2P travel 
equipment 
rental 
5 5 3 3 3 6 4 4 $1,736,000 
P2P sports 
gear rental 
5 6 6 3 2 6 6 4 $2,275,000 
P2P home 
rental 
9 8 5 3 5 5 7 8 $10,100,000 
P2P RV 
rental 
9 8 6 2 6 6 5 4 $16,184,586 
P2P camp 
ground 
rental 
marketplace 
5 8 6 3 6 4 7 5 $17,276,485 
P2P plane 
rental 
10 10 3 3 10 4 4 3 $130,200,000 
 
  
Experiment #9: How does the price of an item affect a (P2P) rental marketplace startup’s odds 
of success? 
 
Hypothesis: Unsure 
 
Reasoning: The more expensive something is, the more someone will want to rent it than buy 
it, so the rental marketplace startup will likely succeed. However, if an item is too expensive, 
the chances of it breaking go up, and thus the probability the owner listing it on a rental 
platform decreases. 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
 
  
Experiment #10: How does the durability of an item affect a (P2P) rental marketplace startup’s 
odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: Durability is correlated with odds of success 
 
Reasoning: Items that are more fragile are less likely to be in the sharing economy. There are 
some interesting dynamics when it is hard to tell if a product has been “damaged” after it has 
been used. For example, on the car rental platform Turo, a customer can drive excessively 
quickly and brake too forcefully repeatedly, ultimately straining the engine and wearing out the 
brakes, but it is hard for the owner to know immediately after getting the car back since the 
effects show up after a prolonged time. Put in another way, the more durable an item, the 
more amount of liquidity on the supply-side of the marketplace. (e.g. No one wants to rent out 
antiques, but people will rent out durable power-tools) 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Correct 
  
Experiment #11: How does the level of concurrent use of Item affect a (P2P) rental marketplace 
startup’s odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: Level of concurrent use is inversely correlated with the odds of success 
 
Reasoning: For Airbnb hosts, there is a fairly predictable flow of customers throughout the 
year. However, for something like a back−up electric generator, in a given area, either power is 
working, and no one needs it, or the power goes off, and everyone needs it at the same. An 
electric generator marketplace is either always going to be extremely demand-constrained or 
supply-constrained. The same goes for a coffee machine rental marketplace -- they won’t work 
since everyone needs coffee at the same time (the mornings). 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Incorrect 
 
 
Experiment #12: How does the frequency of item’s use affect a (P2P) rental marketplace 
startup’s odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: Frequency is inversely correlated with odds of success 
 
Reasoning: If you need an item semi-frequently, you might as well buy it, even if it’s not cheap ( 
e.g., a blender or grill). If you don’t need it too often, then the CLV won’t be high enough to get 
enough repeat purchases and break even on customer acquisition costs. 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Correct 
 
 
Experiment #13: How does the insurability of an item affect a (P2P) rental marketplace 
startup’s odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: Insurability is correlated with the odds of success. 
 
Reasoning: If a product is a high-value item, the marketplace will want to offer insurance to the 
supplier. However, to get an insurance policy, the item had to be appraised, which takes time 
and money, adding friction to the sign-up process. For example, it might be hard to start a P2P 
high-end photography equipment rental marketplace. However, a centralized rental platform 
(like one offered at a Best Buy, B&H, or Adorama) would make sense since it is easier to create 
an insurance policy for a bunch of items at once that are owned by the same person. Also, since 
there is one supplier, and there are many items being renting out, any loss gets amortized 
across multiple rentals, and thus, the supplier might not even need an insurance policy). 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Incorrect 
  
Experiment #14: How does the friction in obtaining and returning the item affect a (P2P) rental 
marketplace startup’s odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: Friction is inversely correlated with the odds of success. 
 
Reasoning: If the item is being picked up from and dropped off to the counterparty, it requires 
aligning schedules twice. Plus, there’s driving time to and from the pick-up/drop-off point to 
account for. A nifty solution that I saw a P2P rental marketplace startup use this summer was to 
have a customer pick up the dress at a dry cleaner and return it back to the dry cleaner when 
done, to be cleaned, after which the next person could pick it up (and drop it off) there. This 
eliminates the need to align schedules with the counterparty. Plus, it saves the counterparty 
from having to drive to the dry cleaner after each rental. Lastly, it reduced driving time for the 
customer because they can plan their schedule in such a way that they can pick up the dress 
when they happen to be in that area next. Breather (which enables people to rent a meeting 
room/workspace for a few hours) has the owner of the space install a smart lock on the door, 
so they don’t have to be physically present every time a renter checks in. 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Correct 
  
Experiment #15: How does liquidity of supply affect a (P2P) rental marketplace startup’s odds 
of success? 
 
Note: Experiment #1 was also related to the liquidity of supply, but that was regarding P2P on-
demand marketplace startups. This is regarding P2P rental marketplace startups. 
 
Hypothesis: Higher liquidity increases the odds of success. 
Reasoning: Same as in Experiment #1. 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Correct 
  
Experiment #16: How does the number of competitors in a market affect a (P2P) rental 
marketplace startup’s odds of success? 
 
Note: Experiment #2 was also related to the number of competitors in a market, but that was 
regarding P2P on-demand marketplace startups. This is regarding P2P rental marketplace 
startups. 
 
Hypothesis: Inverse correlation between the number of competitors and odds of success 
Reasoning: Same as in Experiment #2 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Incorrect  
Group 3: P2P Non-Rental Marketplace 
E.g. Craigslist, Poshmark, Artsy, Freelancer.com 
 
The rightmost column shows the median funding each of the 25 P2P marketplace categories in 
this group. 
 
I sorted the 25 categories by lowest-to-highest median funding and only used the middle 50% 
for the experiments because there are a lot of outliers, both low and high: 
 
 
 
Liquidity in 
Market 
Price of Item 
Cost of Shipping 
the Item 
Compared to the 
Price of Item 
Ability for Item 
to be Delivered 
via Online 
Ability for 
Buyer to Verify 
Quality of Item 
Median Funding 
P2P food 
marketplace 
5 4 6 0 7 $200,000 
P2P home-made 
food marketplace 
3 5 8 0 3 $332,198 
P2P parking spot 
marketplace 
7 5 0 1 10 $491,667 
P2P cross-border 
goods 
marketplace 
4 6 7 0 8 $520,000 
P2P video game 
marketplace 
7 4 4 0 6 $550,000 
P2P flight tickets, 
hotel reservations 
4 6 0 1 9 $870,024 
P2P storage 6 4 6 0 5 $1,375,000 
P2P loans 7 5 0 1 7 $1,624,844 
P2P vintage 
marketplace 
6 6 5 0 6 $1,800,000 
P2P home selling 9 9 0 1 10 $2,000,000 
P2P furniture 
marketplace 
6 7 7 0 7 $2,257,500 
P2P educational 
materials 
marketplace 
9 4 0 1 7 $2,295,311 
P2P clothing 
marketplace 
5 3 8 0 5 $4,850,000 
P2P shoe 
marketplace 
7 6 4 0 7 $5,600,000 
P2P art 
marketplace 
8 8 5 0 8 $12,200,000 
P2P hand-made 
goods 
marketplace 
4 4 5 0 5 $14,096,283 
P2P marketplace 
(general) 
4 5 5 0 5 $14,652,669 
P2P gift card 
marketplace 
5 5 0 1 10 $17,350,000 
P2P photography 
equipment 
marketplace 
4 6 4 0 5 $20,988,088 
P2P car 
marketplace 
8 7 8 0 7 $21,000,000 
P2P music gear 
marketplace 
4 6 5 0 5 $23,700,000 
P2P ticket 
marketplace 
8 6 0 1 10 $26,800,000 
P2P luxury good 
marketplace 
6 8 4 0 6 $39,320,131 
P2P electronics 
marketplace 
6 5 4 0 5 $51,612,506 
P2P doctor 
marketplace 
6 8 0 1 8 $223,000,000 
 
  
Experiment #17: How does liquidity of supply affect a (P2P) non-rental marketplace startup’s 
odds of success? 
 
Note: Experiments #1 and 15 were also related to the liquidity of supply, but they were 
regarding P2P on-demand marketplace startups and P2P rental marketplace startups, 
respectively. This is about P2P non-rental marketplace startups. 
 
Hypothesis: Higher liquidity increases the odds of success. 
Reasoning: Same as in Experiment #1. 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Incorrect 
 
  
Experiment #18: How does the price of an item affect a (P2P) non-rental marketplace startup’s 
odds of success? 
 
Note: Experiments #9 was also related to the liquidity of supply, but that was regarding P2P 
rental marketplace startups. This is about P2P non-rental marketplace startups. 
 
Hypothesis: Unsure 
Reasoning: Same as in experiment #9 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Experiment #19: How does the cost of shipping an item compared to the price of the item 
affect a (P2P) non-rental marketplace startup’s odds of success? 
 
Hypothesis: The cost of shipping an item compared to the price of the item is inversely 
correlated with the odds of success. 
 
Reasoning: If someone is buying a $10 used dress from someone else, but the cost of shipping 
is $8, then they might as well buy a new dress (it would cost ~$20). 
 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Incorrect 
  
Experiment #20: How does the ability for the service to be delivered via online affect a (P2P) 
non-rental marketplace startup’s odds of success? 
 
Note: Experiment #5 was also related to the online deliverability of a service, but that was 
regarding P2P on-demand marketplace startups. This is regarding P2P non-rental marketplace 
 
Hypothesis: Ability to be delivered via online is correlated with odds of success 
 
Reasoning: Same as Experiment #5 
 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Incorrect 
  
Experiment #21: How does the ability for a buyer to verify the quality of an item affect a (P2P) 
non-rental marketplace startup’s odds of success? 
 
 
Hypothesis: The ability to verify is correlated with the odds of success. 
 
Reasoning: If someone knows an object is genuine (like if the service authenticates every item), 
they won’t have a problem with a P2P marketplace. Otherwise, trust issues undermine usage. 
 
 
Experiment Result: 
 
 
 
Hypothesis: Incorrect 
 
  
Summary of Results and Significance 
As an overview of the data and results provided above, many of the hypotheses proved 
correct, although most would not count as statistically significant given the low R^2 of the line 
of best fit. You can view the exact numbers and results in the images provided above. There 
were a few R^2 above 0.2, although most were close to zero. This is mainly due to the relatively 
sparse number of companies in each category (many had an n<5). Also, the assigning of 
numbers from 0-10 for each characteristic was done by me using general mental heuristics. A 
more rigorous approach could potentially have generated higher R^2 scores. 
 
To view the entire list of 500+ P2P marketplace startups I used to construct the various 
categories, you can view the spreadsheet here: 
https://airtable.com/invite/l?inviteId=invwnnnlZYnFt6pRm&inviteToken=b9455dc8d09a
639bbaaec09097021d38b870fedd365debafb6501c292db13cbe 
 
By conducting a more thorough analysis of what P2P rental marketplaces are likely to 
succeed, we can help VCs invest in better companies and thus, more efficiently allocate funding 
dollars. For example, I interned for IAC’s (parent company of Tinder, Vimeo, Angie’s List, etc) 
M&A team in the fall of 2019. IAC is a ~$20 billion market cap holding company and they almost 
exclusively only buy marketplace startups. Therefore, reading this paper might be of interest to 
them given they’re putting a significant amount of capital to work. 
Also, founders interested in starting a company in this space should also read this paper 
because it will prevent them from spending years of their life in a startup that was likely 
doomed to fail in the first place due to marketplace dynamics that might not be obvious 
without having conducted academic research. Regulators would find the paper useful because 
it would allow them to see which verticals are likely to grow the quickest in the sharing 
economy, so they can be proactive in passing appropriate legislation, not reactive. 
The impact of peer-to-peer marketplaces is only increasing and the effects widening, so 
executives in certain industries might be interested in reading this paper. For example, 
consumers are increasingly buying Louis Vuitton clothes on second-hand marketplaces like 
Poshmark. This trend would obviously be of interest to executives at LVMH. 
The rise of these marketplaces also has multiple second-derivative effects. For example, 
when users buy second-hand goods from one another, companies like FedEx and UPS benefit. 
Macro effects like this could be of interest to long-short equity hedge funds. 
Also, since users will be buying fewer new goods and instead, purchasing more second-
hand goods via these platforms, I suspect there will be a trend by manufacturers to produce 
fewer, but higher-quality items. 
The platforms mentioned in this paper are also likely to change as technology changes, 
as well. Technology will change the ability of what can be P2P shared. For example P2P car 
sharing services like Zipcar can be inconvenient because in less-densely populated areas, there 
might not be enough available cars in walking distance. However, via self-driving car technology 
and Tesla’s proposed autonomous car sharing fleet, you’ll be able to summon a Tesla to your 
driveway, thus negating the need for cars to be available in walking distance. This feature will 
likely popularize P2P car sharing. My prediction is that power and capital will shift from the 
manufacturers of these goods to software companies who develop the platforms to exchange 
these goods second-hand: a shift from goods-creators to software-providers. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Limitations of Research 
Because I manually assign ratings to companies according to the characteristics above, 
there is room for subjectivity. For example, it’s hard to give a 0-10 rating for “number of 
competitors” or “difficulty of the regulatory environment.”  
Also, there is an element of survivorship bias in the data set I used (Crunchbase), as 
there would be in any data set in this industry. These aggregator companies generally only add 
a startup to their list after it is mentioned in the press. This means the sample of companies I’m 
using is skewed a bit to the more successful side. For example, a startup that tried doing a P2P 
rental marketplace for skateboards and failed before it could raise capital isn’t likely to be in the 
dataset. Even some categories, like “measure of success” is biased -- for example, using the 
total amount of funding raised is not the best proxy given VCs tend to invest in white, male 
founders from top schools overwhelmingly. 
Also, for some categories, like “on-demand large-haul truck rental,” I only had one 
startup, the median funding for that category was based on a n=1. Similarly, other categories 
only had n=3. Others, like ridesharing, had much larger n’s. This is why I only used the middle 
50% of categories (sorted lowest to highest by funding) to minimize the effect of outliers, both 
large and small. 
Also, it’s hard to compare the successes of startups from different time periods (e.g. 
mid-2010s vs mid 2000s) because the tools founders often build on top of, like APIs, evolve. For 
example, before Stripe, Uber might not have succeeded because users wouldn’t be able to pay 
automatically through their phones. 
  
Further Research 
It would be interesting if someone did qualitative research as well, by interviewing VCs 
and founders. Exploring the impact of new technologies like blockchain on P2P marketplaces is 
fascinating, especially since blockchain is focused on eliminating the “middleman” and 
decentralizing ownership of a platform. 
Also, to avoid survivorship bias in the data, one might try and see if they can find a 
better source of startups -- one that is based on filings of incorporation, for example, instead of 
the one I used (which is based on startups that raised VC money). 
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